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This paper builds a theory based on “informal institutions” to characterize the comparative advantage of 
South-based MNEs. MNEs headquartered in countries with poorer state institutions are shown to 
endogenously invest more in firm-specific institutional capital to compensate for the lack of state institutions, 
and as an optimal response, undertake FDI in countries with weaker institutions. We conduct an extensive test 
of the theory using worldwide firm-level greenfield FDI flows during 2009–2016, employing (among others) 
variations in the interaction of prevalence of informal institutions at home and state institutional qualities of 
host countries, as well as heterogeneity across sectors and firms in their sensitivity to institutional support. 
 




Based on the World Bank's MIGA-EIU survey of foreign investment intentions, governmental interference 
and expropriation of foreign direct investment (FDI) are consistently cited by investors as one of their critical 
concerns (MIGA, 2011, p. 29). Informal mitigation through engagement with host governments, political 
leaders, or local communities remains the most prevalent approach used by foreign investors to mitigate 
expropriation (MIGA, 2011, p. 47). Fig. 1, reproduced from the report, serves to illustrate the importance of 




Fig. 1. Importance of informal institutions in foreign investment. 
Source: World Bank MIGA-EIU Survey (MIGA, 2011, p. 47, Fig. 3.5). Tools used by MNEs to mitigate political risk in 
developing countries (percent of respondents). CDS: credit default swaps. 
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(UNCTAD, 2014). Equally important, the FDI flows from the South pre-
dominantly head toward the peer South. In 2001, 42% of FDI flows
received by the South originated from the South, while 2.7% of FDI
flows received by the North came from the South. This disproportionate
pattern is observed throughout the period 2001–2012, as documented
by Fig. 2. In the existing literature, multinational enterprises (MNEs)
are often theoretically based in the North. This supposition, although
understandable given the North MNEs’ leadership in R&D and technol-
ogy, is increasingly incongruent with the trend. It is thus important to
develop a theoretical framework to formalize the comparative advan-
tage of South-based MNEs.
In this paper, we propose a theoretical model to microfound the
endogenous formation of firm-specific “informal institutions,” which in
turn affects the relative cost structures of MNEs in their choices of for-
eign market entry. In particular, we argue that weaker state institutions
in the South breed heavier investment by firms in informal institutions
as a self-remedy to counter the former’s taxing effects on firm over-
head costs. Such firm-specific informal institutions at home help reduce
the fixed overhead of foreign market entry, more so in destinations
with weaker state institutions, and even more so when serving the for-
eign market via FDI relative to exporting. This gives rise to a positive
assortative matching in the state institutional qualities of FDI source
and destination countries, and a comparative advantage of South-based
MNEs in markets with weaker state institutions. We demonstrate the
“existence” of the proposed theoretical channel based on a global firm-
level dataset of greenfield FDI activities during 2009–2016, where the
identification relies on, among others, directly measured informal insti-
tutions across countries, heterogeneity across industrial sectors in their
demand for institutional support, variations across firms in their pro-
ductivity levels and R&D intensity, and the interaction of these coun-
try/sector/firm characteristics with the destination’s state institutional
qualities, as predicted by the theory.
The term informal institution has been used in the literature to refer to
many things, including customs, traditions, norms, religion, social cap-
ital, trust, reputation and culture.1 We adopt the conception of Helmke
and Levitsky (2004), who define informal institutions as socially shared
rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced
outside of officially sanctioned channels. This distinguishes informal
institutions from informal behavioral regularities, shared values and
the broader concept of culture. Specifically, for the purpose of expo-
sition, we can classify informal institutions as economic, legal, or polit-
ical informal institutions. The relevance of such informal institutions
is documented by many studies in various fields, although the litera-
ture may not have perceived or defined them as such. We point out
below the pattern motivating our theoretical mechanism: the endoge-
nous response of the private sector to the formal institutions the state
provides.
First, where market-supporting institutions such as contract enforce-
ment and bank credit are lacking, firms tend to fill the void with rela-
tional contracting and trade credit. These patterns are documented, for
example, by McMillan and Woodruff (2002) for Russia, China, Poland
and Vietnam. McMillan and Woodruff (1999a,b) provide detailed
accounts of how these informal economic institutions work in Vietnam
under reputation incentives and threat of community sanction. A sim-
ilar argument was suggested by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), that
reputation-based mechanisms can, at least in part, alleviate the prob-
lems originating from weak contract enforcement institutions. Second,
where the state legal institutions are weak, the private sector tends to
turn to informal legal institutions such as private patrols, private pro-
tection agencies or informal courts to substitute for police protection
and judicial systems (Hay and Shleifer, 1998). For example, Frye and
Zhuravskaia (2000) found that higher levels of regulation and weak
1 See, for example, Williamson (2000), Seyoum (2011), and Chan et al.
(2015).
legal institutions are associated with a higher probability of contact
with private protection organizations in Russia. Third (and perhaps the
most controversial of the three, given its many faceted implications),
where the state’s bureaucratic system is inefficient and regulatory qual-
ity poor, firms tend to build political connections (Fisman, 2001; Faccio,
2006) with politicians and government officials, or directly participate
in politics. Such political connections can help firms reduce regulatory
burdens (e.g., fewer days to obtain business permits, fewer agencies to
register with, or fewer on-site inspections), secure property rights (e.g.,
lower expropriation via taxes or fines) and enforce contracts.2
1.1. Contributions to the literature
The hypothesis that similarly poor governance endowments may be
a source of comparative advantage for South-based MNEs when invest-
ing in developing countries was suggested by Morck et al. (2008) for
Chinese outward FDI and by Dixit (2012) in a lecture, among others.
In these studies, ‘experiences’, ‘skills’ and ‘abilities’ of firms based in
the South ‘to deal with burdensome regulations and to navigate around
the opaque political constraints’ and their ‘familiarity’ with the norms
in the host country are often conjectured as potential explanations. In
this paper, we develop a full structural model to account for the endoge-
nous incentives of firms to invest in informal institutions and embed the
endogenous fixed cost structure in a horizontal FDI model to character-
ize the decision of MNEs about foreign market entry and their choice of
production locations. In particular, one of our key hypotheses implies
that the profit differential of FDI relative to exporting to serve desti-
nation markets with poorer state institutions is larger for firms based
in countries with poorer state institutions — hence implying an institu-
tional complementarity effect on FDI. The theory and its propositions
are shown to hold: (i) under the alternative setting of vertical FDI,
and (ii) under generalization that allows informal institutions to affect
marginal cost as well as fixed cost of production.
Several empirical studies based on country-level FDI data (Cezar
and Escobar, 2015; Darby et al., 2010; Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008;
Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007; Habib and Zurawicki, 2002) have docu-
mented patterns, at least in part, consistent with the hypothesis. The
firm-level study of China’s inward FDI by Che et al. (2017) also pro-
vides evidence in line with the proposition. They found that foreign
invested enterprises, at the extensive margin, are less likely to locate in
Chinese regions whose institutional difference from their home coun-
tries is large. In this paper, we provide worldwide firm-level evidence
of the theory’s predictions. In particular, we use the worldwide fDi Mar-
kets database on firm-level greenfield FDI during 2009–2016, and the
global Orbis financial dataset to obtain parent firms’ key performance
measures. Each unit of observation corresponds to an incident of green-
field foreign capital investment in a sector, destination and year by a
firm from a source country reported by fDi Markets. We regress capital
investment on the interaction of the institutional quality indicators of
the home and host countries, on firm productivity and its interaction
with destination institutional quality, and on firm R&D intensity and its
2 For example, Li et al. (2006) found that in China, the probability of
entrepreneurs entering politics decreases by 8–20% when the institutional index
in a region improves by one standard deviation. Chen, Li, Su, and Sun (2011)
similarly showed that firms are more likely to establish political connections in
regions in which the government has more discretion in allocating economic
resources. Bai, Hsieh, and Song (2014) provided a vivid account of how in
the aluminum and auto industries, Chinese local governments may have large
leverage in providing public goods (such as land and capital) to their cronies
and alter the terms of competition in the market. In general, firms may engage
in all three types of informal institutional building (economic, legal and polit-
ical). For example, Cai et al. (2011) inferred that the entertainment and travel
expenditures of Chinese firms include grease money to obtain better govern-
ment services, protection money to lower tax rates, and also business expendi-
tures to build relational capital with suppliers and clients.
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Fig. 2. Disproportionate FDI flows from the South to
the South.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNCTAD’s
Bilateral FDI Statistics (FDI inward flow series)
for 219 economies during the period 2001–2012
(http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics
/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx). We define the South
to be economies in transition and developing
economies, and the North to be developed




interaction with destination institutional quality. We also control for an
extensive set of fixed effects (origin-year, destination-year, destination-
sector) and FDI determinants at the country-pair level.
We find a positive and significant coefficient for the interaction term
of the origin and destination institutional qualities, and such institu-
tional complementarity effects are empirically stronger in sectors that
are more contract intensive and hence more reliant on institutional sup-
port. We further replace the interaction of formal institutions with the
interaction of home informal institutions—using four alternative prox-
ies based on Faccio (2006)—and destination formal institutions. The
sign of the coefficient of the new interaction term is found to be signif-
icantly negative across different measures of informal and formal insti-
tutions. This is consistent with the theoretical mechanism proposed in
the paper: firms based in countries where formal institutions are lack-
ing tend to build more informal institutions; in turn, these allow them
to operate in destinations with poorer formal institutions. In support of
the theoretical setup, we also find that the more productive firms tend
to invest more in countries with poorer state institutions (since these
firms with larger market shares have stronger incentives to locate pro-
duction in countries with lower wages, and they are able to afford the
higher fixed cost associated with larger investment in informal insti-
tutions in such countries). The key finding of an institutional comple-
mentarity effect on firm-level FDI is shown to be robust: (i) to the use
of eight alternative measures of state institutional qualities, (ii) across
the samples of South-based and North-based MNEs, (iii) to dropping
sub-samples of conspicuous origins, destinations, sectors, or tax havens,
(iv) to controlling for initial institutional qualities, and (v) to the use of
alternative productivity measures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 devel-
ops the theoretical model and propositions. Section 3 presents the
firm-level empirical evidence for the propositions. Section 4 con-
cludes. Appendix A provides the proofs of the propositions and devel-
ops the parallel propositions for the alternative setup of vertical FDI.
Appendix B provides further documentation for the data used in the
empirical analysis. The Online Appendix provides the theoretical gener-
alizations in which informal institution affects marginal as well as fixed
costs of production, additional summary statistics tables and estimation
results.
2. Model
In this section, we develop the theoretical propositions in a frame-
work of horizontal FDI. The proofs are provided in Appendix A.1. A par-
allel set of predictions under vertical FDI are provided in Appendix A.2.
We discuss the generality of the proposed mechanisms and possible
extensions in Section 2.3.
Suppose there is a continuum of countries indexed by r ∈ R, where
r is an inverse measure of the quality of formal institutions. The larger
r is, the poorer are the country’s institutions. There is a continuum of
sectors indexed by s producing differentiated goods, and one sector pro-
ducing a homogeneous good (used as the numeraire). The only factor of
production is labor, and the homogeneous good is produced with con-
stant unit labor requirement. Labor endowment is assumed to be large
enough in each country such that the homogeneous good is always pro-
duced. As a result, a country’s labor productivity in the numeraire good
determines its wage rate w. Countries with better formal institutions are
assumed to have higher labor productivity in the numeraire good and
hence a higher wage: w = 𝜔(r) and 𝜔′(r) ≡ d𝜔(r)∕dr < 0.
Each variety of the differentiated goods requires a headquarters ser-
vice component and an intermediate manufactured/service component
using a Cobb-Doublas production function (à la Antràs and Helpman,
2004), where each component has a unit labor requirement equal to
one. This implies a unit cost of production equal to c = w𝜂hw
1−𝜂
d ∕𝜙,
where 𝜙 indexes the productivity of the firm producing the variety,
𝜂 denotes the headquarters intensity in the production, and wh and wd
correspond to the wage rate of the country where the headquarters
and the intermediate production facility of the firm are located, respec-
tively.
The world is populated by consumers with identical preferences:
U = x0 +
1
𝜇
∫ X𝜇s ds, 0 < 𝜇 < 1, where x0 indicates the consumption of
the numeraire good, and Xs a CES function over all available varieties
xs(i) in sector s with an elasticity of substitution 𝜎 (> 1). We drop the
sector index s to simplify the notation where there is no risk of confu-
sion. Given monopolistic competition, the CES preferences imply the
standard pricing and profit functions. Each firm charges a constant
markup over its marginal cost of production p(c) = 𝜎
𝜎−1 c, sells a quan-
tity of x(p(c)) = X𝜎(𝜇−1)+1s p(c)−𝜎 and earns a variable profit:
















can be taken as an index of the mar-
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ket size for the sector (exogenous from the viewpoint of the individual
firm), and 𝜙 ≡ 𝜙𝜎−1 is a transformed index of the firm productivity
level.
2.1. Choice of informal institutions
Each firm, given its productivity level, chooses whether to produce
or not for the home market. If it chooses to produce for the home
market, it incurs a fixed overhead cost fD(rh, Ih), which depends on:
i) the quality of the formal institutions rh at home, and ii) the infor-
mal institutions Ih that the firm invests in. It is assumed that fD(rh, Ih)
strictly increases in rh but strictly decreases in Ih: ∂fD(rh, Ih)∕∂rh > 0 and
∂fD(rh, Ih)∕∂Ih < 0. That is, worse formal institutions increase the fixed
overhead cost, but firm-specific informal institutions help reduce the








i.e., informal institutions are more effective in reducing the fixed over-
head cost in environments with poorer formal institutions. Investing in
informal institutions, however, costs the firm kh(Ih), which is assumed
to be increasing and convex in Ih.
Investment in informal institutions is assumed to be sequential:
firms first choose the optimal level of investment I∗h to minimize the
fixed cost of producing for the home market: FD(rh, Ih) ≡ fD(rh, Ih) +
kh(Ih). Given entry into the home market, firms then choose whether
or not to enter a foreign market (in addition to the home market) and
whether to enter the foreign market via exporting or horizontal FDI.
In the scenario of foreign market entry, it is assumed that firms make
location-specific investments in informal institutions: Id abroad in the
destination d of foreign sales. Nonetheless, the level of informal insti-
tutions that a firm builds at home I∗h still affects (to some extent) its
fixed operating cost in the destination country. If a firm chooses to
enter a foreign market by exporting, it needs to incur additional fixed
cost of serving that market FE(rd, I∗h , Id) ≡ f
E(rd, I∗h , Id) + kd(Id), where
kd(·) is similarly increasing and convex. If the firm chooses to enter via
FDI, the additional fixed cost of serving the foreign market is instead
FFDI(rd, I∗h , Id) ≡ f
E(rd, I∗h , Id) + f
P(rd, I∗h , Id) + kd(Id). We can interpret f
E
as the fixed cost of maintaining the distribution network in the des-
tination (which needs to be incurred in both cases of exporting and
FDI), while fP as the fixed cost of setting up an additional production
plant/facility in a foreign country. Firms choose IE,∗d and I
FDI,∗
d to mini-
mize the fixed cost of foreign market entry in the case of exporting and
FDI, respectively.









h ) = 0, (3)






d ) = 0, (4)











d ) = 0. (5)
Define FD,∗(rh) ≡ FD(rh, I∗h ), F
E,∗(rh, rd) ≡ FE(rd, I∗h , I
E,∗
d ), and
FFDI,∗(rh, rd) ≡ FFDI(rd, I∗h , I
FDI,∗
d ); i.e., they are the respective mini-
mal fixed costs of serving the home market, exporting and horizontal
FDI. We make similar assumptions about fS(rd, Ih, Id) as for fD(rh, Ih).











𝜕f S(rd, Ih, Id)
𝜕Id
)
< 0, for S ∈ (E,P).(6)
We assume the neutral scenario that
𝜕2f S(rd, Ih, Id)
𝜕Ih𝜕Id
= 0, for S ∈ {E,P}, (7)
so there are no reinforcing effects of rh on the choice of Id through
Ih. We discuss the possible scenario of reinforcing effects at the end of
Appendix A.1. Basically, the proposed mechanism is further strength-
ened.
A firm incurs an iceberg trade cost factor 𝜏hd(> 1) when exporting
final or intermediate goods from home country h to the destination
market d. In sum, the net profits of home market, exporting and FDI
are, respectively:
ΠD ≡ 𝜋D − FD,∗(rh) = Bh𝜙(wh)1−𝜎 − FD,∗(rh), (8)
ΠE ≡ 𝜋E − FE,∗(rh, rd) = Bd𝜙(𝜏hdwh)1−𝜎 − FE,∗(rh, rd), (9)







− FFDI,∗(rh, rd), (10)
where in the FDI mode, the headquarters input needs to be shipped to
the foreign market (incurring trade cost) and combined with the inter-
mediate manufactured/service component produced in the destination
market. With trade cost, the market size B refers to that of a national
market indexed by h or d. We characterize the choice and impacts of
informal institutions as follows:
Proposition 1. (i) The investment in destination informal institutions will
be higher for firms engaging in horizontal FDI than for firms entering the
same market by exporting: IFDI,∗d (rh, rd) > I
E,∗
d (rh, rd). (ii) The total fixed
cost of production will be higher for horizontal FDI than for exporting:
FFDI,∗(rh, rd) > FE,∗(rh, rd). (iii) The total fixed cost of horizontal FDI will
be higher in FDI destinations with poorer institutions: dFFDI,∗/drd>0. (iv)
The total fixed cost of exporting will be higher in destinations with poorer
institutions: dFE,∗/drd>0.
Proof. See Appendix A.1. ▪
The predictions in Proposition 1 are derived under the endogenous
choice of informal institutions by firms and yet they are consistent with
typical assumptions (observations) often made in the FDI literature.
First, note that firms will have a stronger incentive to invest in des-
tination informal institutions when they engage in multinational pro-
duction than when they serve the same market by exporting, because
in the former case, the destination informal institutions can be used to
help lower the overhead cost of not only the distribution network in the
destination (which needs to be incurred in both cases of exporting and
FDI), but also the fixed cost of additional production facilities in foreign
countries. This prediction is in line with the fact that larger firms tend
to be more politically connected or politically active (Hellman et al.,
2003; Faccio, 2006; Li et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2011), since MNEs also
tend to be larger than pure-exporting firms. Second, multinational pro-
duction sets a higher threshold than exporting in terms of fixed costs.
This helps explain the typical sorting of MNEs and pure-exporting firms
in terms of productivity. Third, poor state institutions in a market dis-
courage firms from entering the market via horizontal FDI or exports,
by raising the total fixed cost (dFFDI,∗∕drd > 0; dFE,∗∕drd > 0). This is
in spite of the fact that firms endogenously undertake heavier invest-
ment in informal institutions should they choose such locations. Thus,
the direct effect of weak state institutions still dominates the counter-
vailing effect of self-remedy.
Proposition 2. (i) Firms based in countries with poorer institutions will
invest more in home informal institutions: 𝜕I
h,∗(rh)
𝜕rh
> 0. (ii) Firms exporting




> 0. (iii) Multinational firms undertaking horizon-




> 0. (iv) As a corollary of (i), firms based
in countries with poorer institutions and entering foreign markets will be
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Proof. See Appendix A.1. ▪
To interpret Proposition 2, note that the marginal benefit of invest-
ing in informal institutions is higher for firms based in countries with
poorer state institutions, because the firm-specific informal institutions
reduce the fixed overhead cost of home operation more in such envi-
ronments. Similar mechanisms induce firms that enter a foreign market
with poorer state institutions to build more informal institutions at the
destination. The heavier investment in home informal institutions, in
turn, gives South-based firms an advantage over their peers from the
North in dealing with inadequate state institutions in a given foreign
market.
2.2. Optimal foreign market entry mode
For each foreign market, firms choose the entry mode by comparing
the difference in profits from horizontal FDI and exporting. Let ΠΔ ≡
ΠFDI −ΠE denote the difference:
ΠΔ = Bd𝜙((𝜏hdwh)𝜂(1−𝜎)(wd)(1−𝜂)(1−𝜎) − (𝜏hdwh)1−𝜎)
−(FFDI,∗ − FE,∗). (11)
This difference varies with rd according to:
𝜕ΠΔ
𝜕rd












where the first term is positive because in destinations with higher rd,
wages are lower, which reduces the marginal cost of intermediate com-
ponents in the FDI mode but does not affect the variable profits from
exporting. Thus, the difference in variable profits increases with rd. The
sign of the second term depends on the functional form assumptions
about the importance of plant-level fixed cost fP (incurred only under
FDI) relative to distribution fixed cost fE (incurred in both entry modes).
We discuss this further below. The cross derivative of the profit differ-
ential with respect to rh and rd is then:
𝜕2ΠΔ
𝜕rh𝜕rd













where the first term is positive. Thus, the variable profit differential
between FDI and exporting in destinations with higher rd is larger
for firms based in countries with higher rh. This is mainly due to the
complementarity between headquarters and intermediate components
implied by the Cobb-Douglas production function. More importantly,




























where the first and third terms are independent of Id (since there is no
interaction between Ih and Id in the fixed cost function of exporting by
assumption (7)), and hence cancel each other. This leaves the second
term, which is negative because of assumption (6) and Proposition 2(i).
The result in (14) reinforces the complementarity of rh and rd in variable
profit difference between FDI and exporting in (13). Thus, we reach the
key proposition of the paper, as follows:
Proposition 3. (i) (Complementarity of Institutional Qualities in
Firm-level Horizontal FDI) All else being equal, a firm will more likely
choose to undertake horizontal FDI instead of exporting to serve a foreign
market with poorer institutional qualities, the poorer the institutional quality
at home is: 𝜕
2ΠΔ
𝜕rh𝜕rd
> 0. (ii) All else being equal, a firm will more likely choose
to undertake horizontal FDI instead of exporting to serve a foreign market




(iii) All else being equal, a firm will more likely choose to undertake hori-
zontal FDI instead of exporting to serve a foreign market with poorer institu-




All else being equal, a firm will more likely choose to undertake horizontal
FDI instead of exporting to serve a foreign market with poorer institutional




Proof. (i) This follows from the derivations above, where in (13) the
first term is positive and the second term is negative by (14). (ii)–(iv) See
Appendix A.1. ▪
To reiterate, institutional complementarity in firm-level horizontal
FDI arises for two reasons. First, firms based in countries with poorer
institutional qualities tend to be more heavily endowed with firm-
specific informal institutions, which gives them a comparative advan-
tage in conducting FDI (relative to exporting) in destinations having
poorer institutional qualities (since the adverse effect of weak institu-
tions at the destination on fixed cost is reduced by the firm-specific
home institutional investment, more so in destinations with poorer
institutions, and even more so in the FDI entry mode). This is the
key mechanism proposed here. In addition, given the supermodularity
between the headquarters and the intermediate component implied by
the Cobb-Douglas production function, foreign destinations with higher
rd (lower-wage and lower-cost intermediate manufactured/service com-
ponent) increases FDI’s variable profits relative to exporting, and more
so for firms based in countries with higher rh (lower-wage and lower-
cost headquarters input). This second mechanism reinforces the main
mechanism and strengthens the institutional complementarity effect on
FDI.
A larger 𝜙 (or B) increases FDI’s marginal benefit (relative to export-
ing) of producing the intermediate component in a location with lower
wages wd, since the market share of the firm at stake (or the size of
the destination market demand) is larger. In contrast, when a sector is
more headquarters intensive, the cost of the intermediate component
becomes less important, which weakens the incentive of firms to locate
FDI in countries with weaker institutional support.
We now propose possible functional-form assumptions about fE and
fP that satisfy our assumptions:
f E = rd exp(−𝛶 Ih) + rd exp(−Id), 𝛶 > 0, (15)
f P = Ξrd exp(−𝛶 Ih) + Ξrd exp(−Id), Ξ > 0, (16)
where both fE and fP increase with rd, decrease with Ih and Id, and sat-
isfy assumption (6). The fixed-cost functions are also separable in the
home and destination informal institutions, and thus satisfy assumption
(7). The parameter Υ denotes the transnationality of informal institu-
tions at home in reducing destination fixed cost, while Ξ denotes the







= Ξ exp(−𝛶 I∗h ) + (Ξ + 1) exp(−I
FDI,∗
d )










where the sign of (17) depends on the parameters Ξ and Υ, so the
first-order difference in fixed costs of FDI and exporting can increase
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or decrease with rd. Nonetheless, the cross derivative of the fixed-cost
difference with respect to rh and rd in (18) is negative, consistent with
the general derivation in (14). Thus, whatever the fixed-cost difference
between FDI and exporting, the difference is smaller for firms based in
countries having higher rh when the foreign destination has higher rd.
2.3. Discussion of the model
We discuss several possible extensions of the model. First, we have
implicitly assumed that labor productivity is the same across countries
in the production of headquarters or intermediate components for dif-
ferentiated goods. We can relax this assumption without affecting the
result if the wage rate adjusted for labor productivity remains lower in
countries with poorer institutional qualities.
Second, the benchmark model is developed under the horizontal-
FDI framework. In Appendix A.2, we develop the parallel propositions
for a vertical-FDI framework. We show that the same institutional com-
plementarity effect at the firm level continues to apply in this alterna-
tive setting. All else being equal, a firm will choose to undertake FDI in
countries with poorer institutional qualities, the poorer the institutional
quality at home is.
Third, in the benchmark model, we assume that informal institutions
affect only fixed costs. In Online Appendix A.3, we extend the model by
allowing informal institutions to affect both variable and fixed costs. A
firm’s productivity is assumed to be determined by both an exogenous
component 𝜙 and an endogenous part that increases with the firm’s
investment in informal institutions. That is, informal institutions help
to facilitate production processes and enhance a firm’s productivity.
Firms now choose the level of investment in informal institutions I∗h
that maximizes net profit ΠD for home production, and IE,∗d and I
FDI,∗
d
that maximizes ΠE and ΠFDI , respectively, in the case of entering a for-
eign market. We show that the propositions continue to hold with this
generalization. Online Appendix A.4 provides the parallel generaliza-
tion for the vertical-FDI model.
Fourth, the prediction of Proposition 3(ii) is derived
from pure horizontal-FDI incentives. In Appendix A.2 and
Online Appendix A.3–A.4, we show that the positive correlation
between firm productivity and rd continues to hold in the alternative
setting with vertical FDI or where informal institutions affect both fixed
and variable costs. There are some potential factors outside the model
that can moderate this stark prediction. One possible moderating factor
is quality-control risk. Firms that use more sophisticated production
technologies may tend to be more productive but also face higher risk
of quality-control failure, which creates disincentives for such firms
to locate production in countries with poorer institutions (Chang and
Lu, 2012). In the empirical analysis, we control for both firm produc-
tivity and firm R&D intensity, and their interactions with destination
institutional qualities, to distinguish these two potentially distinctive
mechanisms—the market-share incentive to locate production in
countries with lower wages by more productive firms and the quality-
control risk consideration to locate production in countries with better
state institutions by firms with higher technological sophistication.
3. Empirical evidence: FDI activities at the firm level
In this section, we propose empirical specifications and measures
to test the theoretical predictions of Proposition 3. We start with base-
line specifications and present evidence consistent with the theoretical
predictions. We then provide extensive robustness checks to verify that
the effects we identify are indeed driven by the (formal and informal)
institutional mechanism we propose. In view of the theory, we specify
that the firm-level FDI activities depend on institutions and other key
variables as follows:
ln(FDIfshdt) = 𝜷1(Gh,t−1 ∗ Gd,t−1)
+𝛽2 ln(prodf ,t−1) + 𝜷3(ln(prodf ,t−1) ∗ Gd,t−1)
+𝛽4RDf ,t−1 + 𝜷5(RDf ,t−1 ∗ Gd,t−1)
+𝛽6| ln(gdppch,t−1) − ln(gdppcd,t−1)| + 𝛾 ′Xhd,t−1
+𝜒ht + 𝜁dt + 𝜅ds + 𝜖fshdt (19)
where FDIfshdt measures the FDI activity in sector s by firm f of origin
h in destination d in year t, Gc,t−1 is country c’s institutional quality
in year t − 1, prodf ,t−1 denotes firm f’s productivity in year t − 1, and
RDf ,t−1 is firm f’s R&D intensity in year t − 1. The three sets of indicator
variables, {𝜒ht , 𝜁dt , 𝜅ds}, control for origin-year, destination-year, and
destination-sector fixed effects.
Proposition 3(i) implies that firms from countries with better institu-
tions tend to carry out more FDI in destinations with better institutions
(relative to another firm with similar characteristics other than coun-
try of origin) and vice versa. A finding of 𝛽1 > 0 in (19) will provide
empirical support for this hypothesis of an institutional complemen-
tarity effect on FDI. The next two terms in (19) test the prediction of
Proposition 3(ii). It suggests that more productive firms, due to larger
market shares, have stronger incentives to locate production of inter-
mediate components in cheaper locations (i.e., poorer institutions in
the current framework), and implies 𝛽3 < 0. To distinguish this effect
of productivity on FDI from that of quality-control risk as suggested by
Chang and Lu (2012), we include R&D intensity to proxy for a parent
firm’s technological sophistication. The theory of Chang and Lu (2012)
suggests that firms with more complicated production technology have
weaker incentives to engage in FDI because of higher risk of quality-
control failure (𝛽4 < 0), but such disincentive is moderated in destina-
tions with better institutional support (𝛽5 > 0). Including both the firm-
level productivity and R&D intensity, together with their interactions
with destination institutional quality, helps us isolate these two poten-
tial, countervailing, mechanisms. Last, the effects of sector market size
and headquarters intensity on the choice of FDI location, as suggested
by Proposition 3(iii)–(iv), would be absorbed by the destination-sector
FEs.
The Linder hypothesis of FDI, proposed by Fajgelbaum et al.
(2015), suggests that MNEs will tend to invest in countries hav-
ing similar income per capita because of non-homothetic preferences
and proximity-versus-concentration tradeoff of serving foreign mar-
kets. We control for this mechanism by including the absolute differ-
ence in log income per capita between two countries |ln(gdppch,t−1) −
ln(gdppcd,t−1)| as in their study, and expect to find 𝛽6 < 0 accordingly.
The specification in (19) also includes a long list of country-pair covari-
ates Xhd,t−1 to help control for trade costs and the transaction barriers
of FDI. Note that all right-hand-side variables are lagged by one period
in the estimation to reduce any potential simultaneity bias.
3.1. Data and measurement
We construct a panel of firm-level FDI data for the period
2009–2016 by combining the fDi Markets database (which tracks green-
field FDI activities) and the Orbis dataset (which provides firm-level
financial information). The study period is dictated by the availability
of the Orbis firm-level data.
3.1.1. Firm-level FDI data
The fDi Markets database is a service offered by the Financial Times.
The database is the most comprehensive source of firm-level infor-
mation on cross-border greenfield investment available, covering all
countries and sectors worldwide. It provides real-time monitoring of
investment projects, capital investments and job creation. Data are col-
lated through daily searches of Financial Times newswires and internal
information sources, thousands of media sources, project data received
from over 2,000 industry organizations and investment agencies, and
data purchased from market research and publication companies. Each
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Table 1
Composition of the firm-level FDI data
before and after merging.
(2009–2016) Before After
FDI transactions 93,823 32,403
Unique firms 35,039 9278
Source countries 168 88
Destination countries 200 187
FDI sector 39 39
Note: The column ‘Before’ refers to the
fDi Markets dataset and the column ‘After’
refers to the dataset matched with the Orbis
firm-level financial information.
project identified is cross-referenced against multiple sources, with pri-
mary focus on direct company sources.3 This dataset is used as the
primary source of greenfield FDI information by various organizations,
such as UNCTAD and World Bank. It is also increasingly used in FDI
studies. For example, Desbordes and Wei (2017) used this dataset to
examine the effect of financial constraints on FDI activities; Chan and
Zheng, 2017 and Paniagua et al. (2017) studied the effect of networks
on outward FDI; and Castellani and Lavoratori (2017) exploited the
information on the type of project to study the co-location and agglom-
eration of FDI.
For every project initiated overseas, this dataset records the date
when a project is carried out, the parent firm initiating it, the location
of the parent firm (country-state-city), the industry sector of FDI, the
host country (and city), the capital investment of the project (in million
USD), and the number of jobs created. We collapse the firm-level capital
investment (originally reported by date and at the city level) into year
and destination country basis. Thus, the measure of FDI is at the level
of firm, sector, origin country, destination country, and year. As indi-
cated by Table 1, for the period 2009–2016, there are 35,039 unique
firms from 168 origin countries that carried out 93,823 greenfield FDI
transactions in 200 destination countries and in 39 sectors.
The fDi Markets data do have some caveats. These include, first, the
restriction to greenfield FDI announcements appearing in news sources.
In particular, this database tracks cross-border investment in a new
physical project or expansion of an existing investment that creates new
jobs and capital investment. Joint ventures (JV) are only included when
they lead to a new physical operation. Mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
and other equity investments are not tracked. Thus, it does not cover
M&A (and some JV) FDI flows. This, however, may not be a significant
drawback for our study. We can argue that the importance of infor-
mal institutions is more pronounced in the case of greenfield FDI than
M&A (or JV), since in the latter case, the local partner’s informal insti-
tutions available in the host country may relax the institutional con-
straints faced by foreign investors. Greenfield FDI flow thus is an ideal
subject for testing our hypothesis.
Since the fDi Markets data are collected primarily from publicly
available sources, and since companies do not always release informa-
tion on investment amounts, one may expect measurement errors in
the FDI variable, despite efforts made by the data provider to cross-
reference each news report against multiple sources. This will translate
into larger standard errors in the coefficient estimates and less signifi-
cant results. Finally, Fig. 3(a) and (c) and 4 indicate that the fDi Mar-
kets data are skewed toward the US parent firms, the US destination,
and three service sectors for the period of our study. We discuss below




Firm-level financial data (lagged one year) were retrieved from
Orbis (compiled by Bureau van Dijk, BvD). This dataset provides com-
prehensive information on private companies worldwide. In particu-
lar, we use the information on operating revenues, number of employ-
ees, total assets, material costs, and research and development (R&D)
expenses. Data were downloaded in US dollars. The Orbis dataset
includes over 280 million companies around the world, so it is infea-
sible to download all observations. We downloaded the subset of firms
satisfying the following criteria during 2008–2016: (i) firms with obser-
vations in at least one year on operating revenues, number of employ-
ees, and total assets, and (ii) also with observations in at least one
year on material costs (or alternatively, costs of goods sold and costs
of employees), since these variables are required for the estimation of
firm productivity.4
The financial and balance-sheet data in Orbis come from business
registries collected by national chambers of commerce to fulfill legal
and administrative requirements and are relayed to BvD by over 40
different information providers. See Table A1 in Kalemli-Ozcan et al.
(2015) for a list of the information providers of BvD. Coverage of small
firms and balance sheet variables change from country to country given
the filing requirements by business registries in each country. Although
most countries require limited liability companies to register once they
are formed, requirements in terms of who reports (above certain firm
size) and what to report from the balance sheet items vary across coun-
tries. In most European countries, it is a regulatory requirement to file
most of the balance sheet variables for firms of all sizes. Thus, the Orbis
coverage tends to be biased toward large firms and regions where the
filing requirements are more stringent. Fig. 3(e) indicates that the Orbis
data we downloaded indeed have better coverage of firm-level data for
European countries.
We then merge the firms in the fDi Markets dataset with the firms
in Orbis to obtain the parent firms’ annual financial data for the period
2008–2016. The merging process relies on matching of two key identi-
fiers — firm name and home country — from both datasets, based on
fuzzy matching programs and manual inspection.5
As indicated by Table 1, about 35% of FDI observations (at annual,
bilateral country, level) in the fDi Markets dataset are successfully
matched to firms from Orbis. The corresponding figure is 26% by count
of unique firms. As discussed above, the fDi Markets dataset is dom-
inated by the US parent firms (cf. Fig. 3(a)), while Orbis has better
coverage of firm-level data for European countries (cf. Fig. 3(e)). As a
result, as indicated by Fig. 3(b), the frequency of the US as the source of
FDI transactions decreases after the matching, while that of European
countries increases.6 Table 1 also indicates that 80 out of 168 source
countries of parent firms in fDi Markets are not matched in Orbis. The
list of these countries is given in Online Appendix Table B1. They are
mainly African or small island countries. This, as indicated by Fig. 3(e),
is partly due to Orbis’ limited coverage of these countries. On the other
hand, Fig. 3(c)–(d) indicate that the compositions of destination coun-
tries before and after the merging are similar, despite the attrition of
4 When the information on material costs is missing, it is proxied by the dif-
ference between the costs of goods sold and the costs of employees.
5 Stata provides a fuzzy matching program, reclink2. It is an algorithm for
probabilistic record linkage. In particular, it compares strings to determine
whether records are ‘similar’ and provides similarity scores. The package also
provides an algorithm, stnd_compname, to pre-process (standardize) company
names. We standardize each firm’s name in both datasets before applying the
matching program. Because reclink2 is a fuzzy matching algorithm, manual
checking is done to improve accuracy. We inspect each record of matched pairs
and verify whether they are indeed the same company. Matched pairs found by
reclink2 but manually determined to have different (core) standardized names
are dropped.
6 The pattern is very similar if the analysis is based on counts of unique firms
instead of FDI transactions.
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Fig. 3. Country composition of the firm-level FDI data before and after merging.
parent firms that are not matched across the two datasets. Fig. 4 sug-
gests that sector compositions are also relatively similar before and after
the matching process.
Given the set of parent firms with financial data, we first construct
the R&D intensity as the ratio of R&D expenses to operating revenues.
We then estimate firm productivity by four alternative methods pro-
posed in the literature: the methods of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
(LP), Ackerberg et al. (2015) (ACF), Wooldridge (2009) (WRDG), and
Rovigatti and Mollisi (2018) (RM).7 In the estimations, we allow the
production functions to differ across sectors, where the sector is defined
according to the industry sector of FDI reported for the firm by the fDi
Markets dataset. This estimation process provides a panel of productiv-
ity estimates for each firm across years according to its sector of FDI.
Van Beveren (2012) provides a detailed discussion of alternative
7 One possible alternative is the method proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996)
(OP). We do not pursue this method here because it relies on investment as a
proxy (for unobserved productivity), whose level depends on the depreciation
rate assumed and may not be positive. In contrast, the four methods above use
intermediate inputs as a proxy for unobserved productivity. It is common for
firms to report positive use of materials, so we can preserve as many observa-
tions as possible.
productivity estimation methods, and Rovigatti and Mollisi (2018) pro-
vide Monte Carlo simulation comparing the four methods we use here.
In particular, the LP method estimates the labor coefficient in the first
stage and the capital and material coefficients in the second stage. The
ACF method argues that the labor variable and the nonparametric func-
tion in the first stage may be collinear if there are no variations in labor
choice independent of materials, which implies that the labor coeffi-
cient may not be identifiable in the first stage. The ACF method pro-
poses to obtain all input coefficients in the second stage, where the
first stage only serves to net out the error component in the production
function. Wooldridge (2009) suggested that the two-step semiparamet-
ric estimators of LP and ACF can be implemented by a one-step GMM
approach. The RM method further extends the WRDG method by using
dynamic panel instruments.
The Monte Carlo simulation comparison of the four methods con-
ducted by Rovigatti and Mollisi (2018) suggests that the ACF estimator
performs better than LP in terms of bias and MSE. The ACF estima-
tor, however, is shown to be often trapped in local maxima. On the
other hand, the WRDG and RM estimators are shown to have relatively
small bias and MSE. The WRDG method also offers a number of advan-
tages. First, unlike the semiparametric estimators, which require boot-
strapping methods to obtain standard errors for the input coefficients,
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Fig. 4. Sector composition of the firm-level FDI data before and after merging. Note: Count by FDI transaction.
the WRDG method uses the standard robust variance estimator (allow-
ing for serial correlation or heteroskedasticity). Second, it is also more
efficient than the two-step semiparametric estimators, since the latter
ignore the potential correlation between the errors in the two steps. In
view of the above discussion and the relatively straightforward estima-
tion structure, we thus use the WRDG estimator as the benchmark, and
report the results of the other methods in robustness checks.
Some caveats regarding the productivity measures are in order. First
of all, the measure could reflect markup since the estimation is rev-
enue based and firm-level deflators are not available. In the presence of
imperfect competition, we may overestimate the productivity of firms
that charge higher markups than average and vice versa. Relatedly,
given the lack of industry-level deflators at the level of FDI sectors or
firm-level deflators, we use country-level deflators to convert revenues
and input expenditures into 2008 PPP dollars (see Appendix B for more
details). This introduces measurement errors and bias in the produc-
tivity estimates if there are systematic correlations in firm-level price
difference (relative to the country-level price) and input choice. See
Van Beveren (2012) for further discussion. Third, firms in Orbis may
report consolidated or unconsolidated financial statements. In the for-
mer case, the headquarters of a group aggregates all companies belong-
ing to the group, and its productivity measure can be influenced by
its investment overseas. We verify that there are no duplicate firms in
our dataset reporting both consolidated and unconsolidated accounts
to avoid double-counting in our exercises.8 As with other control vari-
ables, we lag the productivity measure by one year in estimation equa-
tion (19), so it is not affected by the current year’s investment overseas,
to avoid simultaneity bias. Overall, these caveats are admittedly diffi-
cult to address and applicable to many other studies.
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of the firm-level vari-
ables. For the period 2009–2016, the minimum positive FDI value is
8 thousand USD, while the maximum is 18.5 billion USD, with mean
of approximately 35.9 million USD. This indicates extensive hetero-
geneities in FDI capital investment across years and across firms. There
are also substantial variations in productivities and R&D intensities
across firms.
3.1.3. Institutional quality and other country-pair characteristics
We measure a country’s institutional quality based on the World-
wide Governance Indicators (WGI) in six dimensions: voice and
accountability (VA); political stability and absence of violence (PV);
government effectiveness (GE); regulatory quality (RQ); rule of law
(RL); and control of corruption (CC).9 Kaufmann et al. (2010) provide
details of the construction of these indicators. Since these indicators are
highly correlated with one another, we include them one at a time in the
estimation of (19). For each governance indicator, a country receives a
8 The consolidated account includes larger amounts of inputs but also larger
amounts of outputs across the entities belonging to a group. It does not neces-
sarily bias the productivity estimate up or down, compared with the alternative
scenario if the headquarters reports an unconsolidated account.
9 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi.
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Table 2
Summary statistics of firms undertaking FDI in 2009–2016.
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
2009–2016:
FDI capital investment (in million USD) 32,403 35.90 302.19 0 18,500
Lagged (2008–2015):
Productivity (in log), WRDG method 19,278 3.77 1.64 −11.53 12.92
Productivity (in log), RM method 19,278 4.03 1.83 −11.86 12.21
Productivity (in log), LP method 19,278 2.96 1.41 −11.61 9.80
Productivity (in log), ACF method 19,278 1.72 2.03 −20.08 7.65
R&D Intensity (= R&D expenses/Operating revenues) 13,621 0.10 3.40 0 259.34
Operating revenues (in log, thousand USD), real 27,369 12.80 3.43 −4.43 19.67
No. of employees (in log) 24,247 7.27 3.24 0 13.78
Total assets (in log, thousand USD), real 28,062 12.77 3.64 −6.55 20.11
Material costs (in log, thousand USD), real 22,077 11.75 3.89 −6.65 19.59
Note: The current values of operating revenues, total assets, and material costs are deflated to 2008 PPP
dollars before being used in the productivity estimations.
point estimate ranging from approximately −2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong).
The higher the index, the better the institutional quality.
In addition to the WGI indicator, we consider two additional insti-
tutional quality measures. These are: (i) contract enforcement (CE),
from World Bank Doing Business,10 and (ii) legal system and security of
property rights (LS), from Economic Freedom, Fraser Institute.11 These
choices follow Nunn (2007), who used RL from WGI, CE sub-indicators
from Doing Business, and LS in his study of contract enforcement. The
CE indicator is a summary index of three sub-indicators in terms of time
(days), cost (% of claim), and quality of judicial processes, to enforce a
contract.12 The LS indicator, on the other hand, is a broad concept that
covers many aspects of the judicial system.13 The CE indicator is on a
scale of 0–100 while the LS indicator has a scale of 0–10. As with the
WGI, the higher the index, the better the institutional quality.
Table 3 provides the summary statistics of the institutional quality
of home and destination countries of FDI in terms of these indicators. It
is evident that FDI origins on average have better institutional qualities,
consistent with the well-documented dominance of North-based MNEs.
The table also indicates that the FDI recipient countries are more dis-
persed than origins in terms of institutional qualities (standard devia-
tions are larger while means are lower for FDI recipient countries).
The list of bilateral trade cost proxies (and FDI barriers) Xhd,t−1
includes distance, contiguity, common language, colonial relationship,
regional trade agreement (RTA), and common currency indicators.
To this list we add bilateral investment treaty (BIT), which indicates
whether two countries have a BIT that offers protection for the other
country’s foreign investments and access to investor-state dispute settle-
ment. In addition, we also include religion similarity, industrial struc-
ture similarity, and endowment difference in capital-labor ratio. This is
to reduce concerns that the interaction of institutional quality indicators
may be systematically correlated with similarity in country character-
istics (in terms of culture, industrial structure, or endowment). Details
on the source and measurement of these country-pair variables are doc-
umented in Appendix B. Table 4 provides their summary statistics.
In sum, the sample of observations used in the analysis refers to






2018.pdf. The index reflects: i. judicial independence, ii. impartial courts,
iii. protection of property rights, iv. military interference in rule of law and
politics, v. integrity of the legal system, vi. legal enforcement of contracts, vii.
regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property, viii. reliability of police,
and ix. business costs of crime.
year by a firm reported by fDi Markets and the corresponding charac-
teristics of the investing firm, origin and destination countries (lagged
by one year). Thus, effectively, the observations use variations in FDI
during 2009–2016 and those of firm/country characteristics during
2008–2015. We use the PPML estimator, because zero FDI values exist
where the firm does not reveal the amount of capital investment.14
3.2. Baseline results
3.2.1. Interactions between home and destination formal institutions
Table 5 reports the PPML estimation results of equation (19) with
the basic set of country-pair controls. As shown by the table, the coef-
ficient of (Gh,t−1∗Gd,t−1) is positive and significant across all the six
WGI governance indicators and the legal-system indicator. This pro-
vides support for our theoretical prediction of an institutional comple-
mentarity effect on firm-level FDI activities. The estimate of the institu-
tional complementarity effect increases in magnitude across the board
in Table 6 if we further include extra country-pair controls (endowment
difference and similarity in industrial structure and religion). The coef-
ficient of (Gh,t−1∗Gd,t−1) in the case of contract enforcement is now also
precisely estimated and positive.
Recall that the WGI indicators are on a scale of −2.5 to 2.5, the CE
indicator on a scale of 0–100 and the LS indicator on a scale of 0–10.
Thus, to compare across indicators, we need to scale up the coefficient
for the CE interaction term by 400 (= (100∕5)2) and that for the LS
interaction term by 4 (= (10∕5)2). The results in Table 6 indicate that
the institutional complementarity effects have similar orders of magni-
tude, with stronger effects in terms of the legal system (LS), rule of law
(RL), and government effectiveness (GE), but weaker effects in terms of
voice and accountability (VA), control of corruption (CC), and contract
enforcement (CE).
Furthermore, Tables 5 and 6 indicate that firm productivity has a
positive effect on FDI, and the coefficient of (ln(prodf ,t−1)∗Gd,t−1) is
negative, consistent with the prediction of Proposition 3(ii). As argued
by the theory, more productive firms, given their larger market shares,
have stronger incentives to undertake FDI in destinations with lower
wages. At the same time, their heavier investment in informal institu-
tions allows them to operate in such destinations with poorer institu-
tions. The exercise also finds support for the theory of Chang and Lu
(2012): the coefficient of RDf ,t−1 is significantly negative but that of
(RDf ,t−1∗Gd,t−1) is positive. Thus, firms that are R&D intensive tend to
14 Because the universe of FDI relations (nil or active) across all firm-sector-
origin-destination-year combinations is too large for typical computing capacity
to handle, it is infeasible to conduct analysis of the extensive margin of FDI
using Probit or Logit estimations.
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Table 3
Institutional quality of home and destination countries (firm-level FDI in 2009–2016).
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Home country
VA (Voice and Accountability) 32,392 1.14 0.50 −1.88 1.74
PV (Political Stability and Absence of Violence) 32,403 0.60 0.55 −2.81 1.55
GE (Government Effectiveness) 32,403 1.40 0.52 −1.53 2.44
RQ (Regulatory Quality) 32,403 1.32 0.53 −2.14 2.26
RL (Rule of Law) 32,403 1.41 0.57 −2.03 2.10
CC (Control of Corruption) 32,403 1.40 0.71 −1.40 2.45
CE (Contract Enforcement) 32,362 69.11 11.00 20.82 93.36
LS (Legal System & Security of Property Rights) 32,340 7.38 0.93 2.03 8.91
Destination country
VA (Voice and Accountability) 32,397 0.37 1.02 −2.26 1.74
PV (Political Stability and Absence of Violence) 32,398 0.16 0.81 −3.08 1.55
GE (Government Effectiveness) 32,389 0.79 0.86 −2.20 2.44
RQ (Regulatory Quality) 32,389 0.72 0.87 −2.45 2.26
RL (Rule of Law) 32,396 0.67 0.98 −2.42 2.10
CC (Control of Corruption) 32,390 0.61 1.04 −1.77 2.45
CE (Contract Enforcement) 32,210 65.29 13.68 2.08 93.36
LS (Legal System & Security of Property Rights) 31,991 6.37 1.33 1.43 8.91
Note: Statistics refer to institutional quality lagged by one year before the year of FDI.
Table 4
Summary statistics of control variables (firm-level FDI in 2009–2016).
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
|ln(gdppch,t−1) − ln(gdppcd,t−1)| 32,354 1.18 1.11 0.000152 5.51
ln(distancehd) 32,088 8.18 1.12 4.09 9.90
contighd 32,088 0.10 0.29 0 1
comlanghd 32,088 0.20 0.40 0 1
colonyhd 32,088 0.17 0.37 0 1
comcolhd 32,088 0.02 0.13 0 1
smctryhd 32,088 0.02 0.13 0 1
rtahd,t−1 32,333 0.42 0.49 0 1
comcurhd,t−1 32,389 0.08 0.28 0 1
bithd,t−1 32,403 0.43 0.50 0 1|(K∕L)h,t−1 − (K∕L)d,t−1| 32,260 0.18 0.13 0.000035 0.67
indsimhd,t−1 30,996 0.95 0.03 0.78 0.9986
relsimhd,t−1 31,376 0.90 0.09 0.65 0.9996
CIs 19,097 0.67 0.20 0.34 0.89
engage in less FDI, but such disincentive is moderated by better institu-
tions in the destination. Based on Table 6, if we adjust the difference in
scales of CE and LS (by 20 times and 2 times relative to the six WGI indi-
cators), the coefficients of (ln(prodf ,t−1)∗Gd,t−1) and (RDf ,t−1∗Gd,t−1) in
terms of CE and LS, respectively, are in orders of magnitude similar to
the case of the WGI indicators.
The findings for the other country-pair variables are sometimes sen-
sitive to the inclusion of extra pair controls, in contrast with the robust
institutional complementarity effect. For example, the coefficient of
bilateral distance is negative in Table 5 with the basic set of controls,
but becomes positive in Table 6 with the extended set of controls. In the
latter case, similarities in industrial structure and religion composition
both increase FDI volume, while the difference in capital-labor ratios
has no significant effects on FDI. This indicates that for the sample
under study, distance tends to be negatively correlated with similar-
ity in industrial structure and religion. There are different theoretical
arguments in the literature for a positive or negative effect of distance
on FDI, and which of these mechanisms dominates may depend on the
sample under study.
Also noteworthy is the positive sign of the difference in GDP per
capita, which is quite robust throughout most of our analyses. This may
not be a clear rejection of the Linder hypothesis of Fajgelbaum et al.
(2015), since their theory is driven by horizontal FDI motives, while our
sample pools both vertical and horizontal FDI. Because vertical FDI is
motivated by cost-saving considerations, larger differences in incomes
between origins and destinations can promote FDI flows. Unfortunately,
there is no satisfactory way to disentangle the two modes of FDI in
this exercise (following methods such as in Alfaro and Charlton, 2009),
because the fDi Markets dataset reports the type of FDI activity in very
broad categories. Lastly, contiguity, common language, and common
currency all tend to promote FDI, as expected, and are robust to the
extra pair controls.
In the subsequent analysis, we use the extensive list of country-pair
controls (with endowment difference, and similarity in industrial struc-
ture and religion composition), but present only the main coefficients
of interest in the tables. The full list of coefficient estimates is available
upon request.
3.2.2. Interactions between home informal institutions and destination
formal institutions
In this section, we utilize direct measures of informal institutions to
test the hypotheses. Although there are country-specific studies related
to “informal institutions” such as McMillan and Woodruff (2002) and
McMillan and Woodruff (1999a,b) on “informal economic institutions”;
Hay and Shleifer (1998) and Frye and Zhuravskaia (2000) on “informal
legal institutions”; and Fisman (2001), Li et al. (2006), Chen et al.
(2011), Bai et al. (2014), and Cai et al. (2011) on “informal political
institutions,” there are rare systematic cross-country studies of infor-
11
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Table 5
Firm-level FDI dependence on institutional quality.

































































































































































































































































# Observations 7686 7686 7686 7686 7686 7686 7670 7652
R2 0.774 0.768 0.777 0.777 0.777 0.778 0.765 0.761
origin-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination-sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: PPML estimation of equation (19). Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are reported in parentheses. Productivity estimates based
on the WRDG method and operating revenues. The entries ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
mal institutions.15 The closest to this is the study by Faccio (2006),
which provides measures of the prevalence of politically connected
firms across countries: (1) percentage of firms in a country that is con-
nected with a minister or a member of parliament (MP); (2) percentage
of firms in a country connected with a minister or MP, or a close rela-
tionship; (3) percentage of top 50 firms connected; and (4) percentage
of market capitalization of connected firms. We use these four measures
as alternative proxies for informal institutions prevalent in a country.
The summary statistics for these four measures of informal institutions
are provided in Table 7.
In this set of analysis, we replace the interaction term of home and
destination formal institutions (Gh,t−1∗Gd,t−1) with the interaction of
15 The double quotations are used around informal institutions in the above
statements because they are not referred to as such by the original papers but
are categorized by us.
informal institutions at home and formal institutions of the FDI destina-
tion (Ih∗Gd,t−1). The analysis is repeated for each of the four alternative
proxies of informal institutions. Tables 8–11 show that the sign of the
coefficient of the new interaction term is significantly negative across
different measures of informal and formal institutions. This is consistent
with the theoretical mechanism proposed in the paper: when firms are
based in a country where formal institutions are lacking, they tend to
build more informal institutions; in turn, these allow them to conduct
FDI in destinations with poorer formal institutions. The results for the
other coefficients of interest remain robust.
The measures of Faccio (2006) are unfortunately time-invariant
(constructed based on data pertaining to the period 1997–2001). Thus,
the measures do not provide more time variations (than formal insti-
tutions), as would be the ideal case. The measures of Faccio (2006)
are also limited in terms of country coverage (47 countries), although
the set of countries includes both developed and developing nations
12
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Table 6
Firm-level FDI dependence on institutional quality — extra country-pair controls.

















































































































































































































































































































# Observations 7056 7056 7056 7056 7056 7056 7044 7025
R2 0.825 0.827 0.833 0.832 0.834 0.831 0.825 0.828
origin-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination-sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: PPML estimation of equation (19). Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are reported in parentheses. Productivity estimates based on the
WRDG method and operating revenues. The entries ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
(see Table 2 therein). Thus, the sample size is reduced in this specifica-
tion, but the spectrum of home countries is not skewed to developed or
developing countries.
3.2.3. Variations in contract intensity across sectors
In this section, we explore potential heterogeneity in institutional
complementarity effects across sectors. For this purpose, we use sec-
toral contract intensity, which measures the importance of relationship-
specific inputs used in the production of a sector. The larger the mea-
sure, the more important are contract enforcement and related insti-
tutions that alleviate the under-investment inefficiency associated with
incomplete contracts. We use the contract intensity measure of Nunn
(2007), whose concordance with the fDi Markets sectors is provided in
Desbordes and Wei (2017, Table A1). Table B2 of the Online Appendix
lists the contract intensity for each of the FDI sectors. Note that the
measure is available mainly for manufacturing sectors.
We classify sectors into those that are contract intensive (with con-
tract intensity higher than the median of the sample) and otherwise
(with contract intensity lower than the median), with a correspond-
ing indicator, CIs, which takes value one in the former case and zero
in the latter case. In addition to the institutional interaction term
(Gh,t−1∗Gd,t−1) in the benchmark specification (19), we add a triple
13
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Table 7
Informal institutions of home countries (firm-level FDI in 2009–2016).
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Informal Institution
(i) % of firms connected with a minister or MP 31,156 2.87 2.80 0 10.30
(ii) % of firms connected with a minister, MP, or a close relationship 31,156 3.12 3.00 0 22.08
(iii) % of top 50 firms connected 31,156 11.64 16.20 0 46.00
(iv) % of market capitalization of connected firms 31,156 10.09 13.92 0 41.62
Note: Measures are based on the study of Faccio (2006).
Table 8
Firm-level FDI dependence on institutional quality — informal institutions (i).

















































































# Observations 6762 6762 6762 6762 6762 6762 6750 6739
R2 0.827 0.833 0.838 0.842 0.837 0.833 0.834 0.834
origin-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination-sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
extra country-pair controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: PPML estimation of equation (19) with (Gh,t−1∗Gd,t−1) replaced by (Ih∗Gd,t−1). Refer to Table 7 for the definition of the informal institution measure (i).
Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are reported in parentheses. Productivity estimates based on the WRDG method and operating revenues.
The entries ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Table 9
Firm-level FDI dependence on institutional quality — informal institutions (ii).

















































































# Observations 6762 6762 6762 6762 6762 6762 6750 6739
R2 0.827 0.832 0.838 0.842 0.836 0.833 0.833 0.833
origin-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination-sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
extra country-pair controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: PPML estimation of equation (19) with (Gh,t−1∗Gd,t−1) replaced by (Ih∗Gd,t−1). Refer to Table 7 for the definition of the informal institution measure (ii).
Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are reported in parentheses. Productivity estimates based on the WRDG method and operating revenues.
The entries ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
interaction term (CIs∗Gh,t−1∗Gd,t−1) of the above with the FDI sector’s
contract intensity indicator. As shown in Table 12, the signs of the coef-
ficients of the main institutional interaction term and the triple interac-
tion term are positive when precisely estimated. This indicates that the
institutional complementarity effect is positive, and is stronger in sec-
tors that are contract intensive. This in a way is consistent with our pro-
posed mechanism: although not explicitly modeled in theory, the effect
of institutions on fixed costs (and variable costs in the extended model
provided in Online Appendix A.3–A.4) is likely to be more significant
in sectors that depend more on the quality of institutions. The results in
14
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Table 10
Firm-level FDI dependence on institutional quality — informal institutions (iii).

















































































# Observations 6762 6762 6762 6762 6762 6762 6750 6739
R2 0.826 0.828 0.832 0.835 0.831 0.828 0.828 0.827
origin-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination-sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
extra country-pair controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: PPML estimation of equation (19) with (Gh,t−1∗Gd,t−1) replaced by (Ih∗Gd,t−1). Refer to Table 7 for the definition of the informal institution measure (iii).
Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are reported in parentheses. Productivity estimates based on the WRDG method and operating revenues.
The entries ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Table 11
Firm-level FDI dependence on institutional quality — informal institutions (iv).

















































































# Observations 6762 6762 6762 6762 6762 6762 6750 6739
R2 0.826 0.828 0.832 0.834 0.831 0.828 0.828 0.826
origin-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination-sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
extra country-pair controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: PPML estimation of equation (19) with (Gh,t−1∗Gd,t−1) replaced by (Ih∗Gd,t−1). Refer to Table 7 for the definition of the informal institution measure (iv).
Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are reported in parentheses. Productivity estimates based on the WRDG method and operating revenues.
The entries ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
this section thus strengthen the validity of the theoretical mechanism
proposed in the paper. The findings for the other coefficients of interest
remain robust.
3.2.4. South-based versus north-based MNEs
In this section, we allow the coefficients of the interaction terms in
the main specification to differ depending on the level of development
of the home country of the MNE. We follow the UN country classifica-
tions and define the home country of MNEs as the South (SMNE = 1)
if the country is in the group of economies in transition or developing
economies, and as the North if the country is in the group of developed
economies (SMNE = 0).16 This exercise aims to verify that the institu-
tional complementarity effects identified above are indeed applicable
to the South-based MNEs that motivate our study and theory.
We add additional triple interaction terms (SMNEh∗Gh,t−1∗Gd,t−1,
SMNEh∗ln(prodf ,t−1)∗Gd,t−1, and SMNEh∗RDf ,t−1∗Gd,t−1) to the main
specification in (19). The coefficients of the double interaction terms
represent the baseline effects common to both South-based and North-
based MNEs, and the coefficients of the triple interaction terms cor-
respond to the additional effects on the South-based MNEs. Table 13
indicates that the overall institutional complementarity effect remains
positive, with the effects on South-based MNEs stronger than on North-
16 https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/
2014wesp_country_classification.pdf. In particular, the group of developed
economies includes 28 EU member states, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland,
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and the US.
15
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Table 12
Firm-level FDI dependence on institutional quality — sectoral contract intensity.

































































































# Observations 5289 5289 5289 5289 5289 5289 5278 5268
R2 0.705 0.705 0.707 0.707 0.709 0.708 0.703 0.701
origin-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination-sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
extra country-pair controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: PPML estimation of equation (19) with an additional term: CIs∗Gh,t−1∗Gd,t−1. Refer to Table B2 of the Online Appendix for the degree of contract
intensity across sectors. Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are reported in parentheses. Productivity estimates based on the WRDG method
and operating revenues. The entries ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
based MNEs, when the WGI indicators are used. In the case of CE and
LS, the coefficient of the triple interaction term SMNEh∗Gh,t−1∗Gd,t−1 is
insignificant or negative, but in an order of magnitude much smaller
than the coefficient of Gh,t−1∗Gd,t−1; thus, the total effect of the institu-
tional interaction terms is positive for South-based MNEs.
The coefficient of the interaction of firm productivity and destina-
tion institutional quality continues to be significant and negative, and
more negative for South-based MNEs, suggesting that more productive
MNEs based in the South are less inhibited by poor institutions in the
destination than their North peers, all else being equal. Finally, the
benchmark conclusion regarding R&D intensity and its interaction with
destination institutional quality still holds for the North-based MNEs,
although less robustly so for the South-based MNEs. This is understand-
able given that the quality-control risk mechanism proposed by Chang
and Lu (2012) is modeled for North-based MNEs whose technological
complexity exceeds the technology frontier of potential FDI destina-
tions. In the case of South-based MNEs, this constraint might not be
binding across all firms and hence the relationship identified is likely
subject to more idiosyncrasies.
3.3. Robustness checks
3.3.1. Dropping US or top service sectors
As discussed in Section 3.1.1, the fDi Markets data are skewed
toward US parent firms, the US destination, and three service sectors
for the period of our study. After merging with the Orbis data, the dom-
inance of the US parent firms decreases, but the destination and sector
compositions remain similar (cf. Figs. 3 and 4 again). This may raise
concern about the representativeness of the merged sample and the
robustness of the results to the conspicuous destinations and sectors.
To alleviate such concerns, we first drop the US parent firms. As
indicated by Table B3 of the Online Appendix, the results for all coeffi-
cients of interest are qualitatively similar to the benchmark in Table 6.
Thus, the findings are not driven by the US parent firms alone, and as a
result, the attrition of US parent firms due to the merging process may
pose less of a threat to the conclusion. Next, we drop the FDI observa-
tions where the destination is the US. Again, the results are fairly robust
to this variation. Last, we drop the three top service sectors in terms of
FDI activities: Software & IT Services, Business Services, and Financial
Services. In fact, the coefficient estimates of the institutional interaction
term are very similar to the benchmark. Thus, the findings apply to the
manufacturing as well as service sectors.
3.3.2. Dropping tax havens
Next, we drop jurisdictions that are considered to be tax havens,
as origins or destinations. We consider two alternative lists of tax
havens. The first list, following Investopedia, consists of Andorra,
Bahamas, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands,
Channel Islands, Cook Islands, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Liechtenstein,
Mauritius, Monaco, Panama, Switzerland and St. Kitts and Nevis.17 The
second list, published by the EU on June 17, 2015 (which is relevant
for our period of study), includes 30 jurisdictions: Andorra, Anguilla,
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Vir-
gin Islands, Brunei, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Grenada, Guernsey,
Hong Kong, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Nauru, Niue, Marshall
Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, Montserrat, Panama, St Kitts and Nevis,
St Vincent and the Grenadines, Seychelles, Turks and Caicos, US Virgin
Islands, and Vanuatu.18
As Table B4 of the Online Appendix indicates, the institutional com-
plementarity effects remain similar in magnitudes to the benchmark in
Table 6 for all institutional indicators. The findings are also similar for
the other coefficients of interest.
3.3.3. Informal institution robustness checks
In this section, we repeat the analysis in Sections 3.2.3–3.3.2, replac-
ing the home formal institutions with informal institutions as intro-
duced in Section 3.2.2. The results based on measure (iv)—% of market
capitalization of connected firms—are summarized in Table 14. Note
the caveats discussed above associated with the measures of informal
institutions (time invariant and limited country coverage relative to the
formal institution measures). We choose measure (iv) for the robust-
ness checks, as it incorporates both extensive margins (firm count) and
intensive margins (firm size) in gauging the influence of informal insti-
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Table 13
Firm-level FDI dependence on institutional quality — South versus North-based MNEs.

































































































































# Observations 7056 7056 7056 7056 7056 7056 7044 7025
R2 0.833 0.838 0.844 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.843 0.844
origin-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination-sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
extra country-pair controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: PPML estimation of equation (19) with additional interaction terms: SMNEh∗(Gh,t−1∗Gd,t−1), SMNEh∗(ln(prodf ,t−1)∗Gd,t−1) and SMNEh∗(RDf ,t−1∗Gd,t−1),
where SMNEh equals one if the firm making the FDI is based in the South and zero otherwise. Refer to the main text for the definition of the South. Robust
standard errors clustered by country pairs are reported in parentheses. Productivity estimates based on the WRDG method and operating revenues. The entries
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
The overall conclusions are consistent with those based on the for-
mal institutions of source countries. MNEs based in countries charac-
terized as having higher levels of informal institutions tend to make
more FDI in destinations with poorer formal institutions. The identified
relationship tends to be stronger for contract-intensive sectors; applies
to both South-based and North-based MNEs overall; and is robust to
variations in the sample (by dropping the US MNEs, the US as a FDI
destination, the top three service sectors, or the tax havens). The coeffi-
cient estimates for firm characteristics and their interaction with desti-
nation institutional quality, although not reported, are similar to those
in Tables 12 and 13 and Tables B3–B.4 of the Online Appendix.
3.3.4. Controlling for initial institutional qualities
In this section, we consider controlling for interaction of initial insti-
tutional qualities, to address concerns about omitted variables. Note
that it is not practical to incorporate country-pair fixed effects in the
current exercise, for two reasons. First, the formal institutional quali-
ties are a slow-moving process, so including country-pair fixed effects
removes most of informative variations from the measure. Second, the
greenfield FDI activities at the firm level are not a frequent event within
the majority of country pairs; it is demanding for the identification to
rely on within-country-pair variations. If the key variable we use — the
interaction of institutional variables — are picking up effects of some
invariant (and omitted) country-pair characteristics, inclusion of the
variable’s initial value might help absorb such effects to certain extents.
To this end, we add Gh,0∗Gd,0 to the list of baseline controls used
in Table 6, where the initial value used (Gh,0∗Gd,0) refers to the insti-
tutional qualities of year 2007, given that the period of FDI activi-
ties studied is 2009–2016 and the control variables used are lagged
by one year (2008–2015). We also repeat the same analysis based on
Ih∗Gd,t−1, and consider variations in contract intensity across sectors
in both scenarios (CIs∗Gh,t−1∗Gd,t−1 or CIs∗Ih∗Gd,t−1), with the initial
value Gh,0∗Gd,0 controlled for. The four sets of results are summarized
in Table B5 of the Online Appendix. The coefficients of Gh,t−1∗Gd,t−1
are overall positive when precisely estimated, and more positive in sec-
tors that are contract-intensive. Exceptions arise in the case of control
of corruption (CC) and contract enforcement (CE), but such irregularity
disappears once we rely on the specification based on informal institu-
tions (Ih∗Gd,t−1). The coefficient estimates of Ih∗Gd,t−1 are negative, and
more negative in contract-intensive sectors, across measures of institu-
tional qualities. The findings are very similar if we use the institutional
qualities of year 2006 instead of 2007 as the initial values.
3.3.5. Single versus multiple FDI destinations
In the remaining two robustness checks, we focus on the effects of
firm characteristics on FDI activities. In addition to the institutional
complementarity effect documented, there is a regular pattern in the
coefficients of productivity, R&D intensity, and their interactions with
destination institutional quality. In particular, the coefficient of the
interaction between productivity and destination institutional quality
is negative. Some may argue that this finding is due to a pecking order
in the sorting of multinational firms across countries, where more pro-
ductive multinational firms invest in more countries compared to less
productive firms, and as a result its set of FDI destinations is more likely
to include both countries with good institutional quality and those with
poor institutional quality. This is in contrast with our theory that more
productive firms tend to undertake FDI in countries with poorer institu-
tions rather than in countries having better institutions, due to market
share considerations.
To distinguish these two competing hypotheses, we create a dummy
to indicate whether a firm invests in multiple foreign countries in a
year and a sector (multidest_dum = 1) or in a single foreign country
(multidest_dum = 0). We add a triple interaction term between this indi-
cator, productivity and destination institutional quality. The results in
Table 15 indicate that the coefficient of the interaction between pro-
ductivity and destination institutional quality is negative, and the coef-
17
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Table 14
Firm-level FDI dependence on institutional quality — robustness checks based on informal institutions.
VA PV GE RQ RL CC CE LS























































































































































origin-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination-sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
extra country-pair controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: PPML estimation of equation (19), with variations in the specifications as explained in the footnote of Tables 12 and 13 of the paper and Tables B3–B4
of the Online Appendix. Informal institutions are based on measure (iv): % of market capitalization of connected firms. Robust standard errors clustered
by country pairs are reported in parentheses. Productivity estimates based on the WRDG method and operating revenues. The entries ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
ficient of the triple interaction is positive when significant (but with
much smaller magnitudes), such that the two coefficients’ sum is still
negative. This suggests that more productive firms invest in countries
with poorer institutions, and as they invest in more destinations, they
move up the ‘institutional quality ladder’. Thus, the conclusion is in
favor of our proposed hypothesis.
As an extra robustness check, we define the dummy instead accord-
ing to whether a firm invests in multiple foreign countries in a sec-
tor during the period of study (multidest_dum = 1) or in a single foreign
country (multidest_dum = 0). The results, as shown in the lower panel
of Table 15, are similar. At the same time, the findings on institutional
complementarity and R&D intensity remain robust.
3.3.6. Alternative productivity measures
In this set of robustness checks, we adopt alternative productivity
measures based on the estimators of Rovigatti and Mollisi (2018) (RM),
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP), and Ackerberg et al. (2015) (ACF).
See Section 3.1.2 for a summary of these estimators and their potential
caveats. As discussed, in view of potential drawbacks of LP and ACF,
we used the WRDG estimator in the main analysis above.
The results are summarized in Table 16. The institutional comple-
mentarity effect remains robust to the use of alternative productivity
measures. The interaction of R&D intensity and destination institutions
also remains positive and robust. The interaction of productivity and
destination institutions continues to be negative in the case of RM, neg-
ative but not as precisely estimated in the case of LP, and negative
overall with the exception of CE in the case of ACF.
We also repeat the other analysis presented above with the alterna-
tive productivity estimators (unreported in tables). The general obser-
vation is that the institutional complementarity pattern is very robust
to the choice of productivity estimators. The signs of the coefficients
of R&D intensity and its interaction term with destination institutional
quality are also fairly robust. The choice of productivity estimators
mainly affects the coefficient of productivity and its interaction with
destination institutional quality. The sign of the coefficient of produc-
tivity is positive and the interaction term negative (as the theory sug-
gests) in the case of WRDG and RM, and not as robustly so in the case
of LP. When based on ACF, the sign of the coefficient of productivity
tends to be negative instead (contrary to ex ante expectation), while the
sign of the coefficient of the interaction between productivity and des-
tination institutional quality still tends to be negative. In general, the
signs of the coefficients are more regular and precisely estimated based
18
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Table 15
Firm-level FDI dependence on institutional quality — firms undertaking FDI in single vs. multiple destinations.
VA PV GE RQ RL CC CE LS

































































































# Observations 7056 7056 7056 7056 7056 7056 7044 7025
R2 0.825 0.829 0.837 0.834 0.837 0.832 0.829 0.831

































































































# Observations 7056 7056 7056 7056 7056 7056 7044 7025
R2 0.828 0.830 0.835 0.832 0.835 0.832 0.828 0.831
origin-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination-sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
extra country-pair controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: PPML estimation of equation (19) with an additional term multidest_dumf ,t∗ln(prodf ,t−1)∗Gd,t−1. I. The indicator multidest_dum equals one
if a firm invests in multiple foreign countries in a year and a sector (multidest_dum = 1); and zero if a firm invests in a single foreign country
(multidest_dum = 0). II. The indicator multidest_dum equals one if a firm invests in multiple foreign countries in a sector during the period of
study (multidest_dum = 1); and zero if a firm invests in a single foreign country (multidest_dum = 0). Robust standard errors clustered by country
pairs are reported in parentheses. Productivity estimates based on the WRDG method and operating revenues. The entries ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
on WRDG and RM, while they are more irregular across institutional
indicators in the case of ACF, with the results based on LP somewhere
in between.19
Given the potential issues of productivity estimations highlighted in
Section 3.1.2, we might need to take the results pertaining to produc-
tivity (and productivity interacted with destination institutions) with a
19 It is also possible to implement the productivity estimations by value added
instead of revenues. The former takes the difference between revenues and
intermediate inputs such as materials, before estimating a value-added func-
tion in labor and capital, while the latter estimates the production function in
all inputs. In fact, the ACF method was proposed by means of a value-added
function. We choose to take the revenue-function approach, as the value-added
approach requires a stronger functional form assumption about the production
structure. In particular, it assumes that the production function is a Leontief
function in value added and intermediate inputs. See Gandhi et al. (2017) for
further discussion.
grain of salt. Nonetheless, the various variations in specifications and
robustness checks conducted in Sections 3.2–3.3 demonstrate consistent
empirical support for the proposed institutional complementarity effect
and its theoretical mechanism.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a theoretical framework to underpin at the
micro level the endogenous formation of firm-specific informal institu-
tions; such that South-based MNEs have a comparative advantage in
dealing with the inefficiency associated with weak formal institutions
and to maneuver in relationship-based investment environments, rela-
tive to their peers from the North. The theory predicts complementarity
of institutional qualities of the home and destination countries in bilat-
eral FDI flows at the firm level. This helps explain the greater presence
of South-based MNEs in countries having relatively poorer institutions.
In addition, our theoretical framework also suggests interesting testable
19
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Table 16
Firm-level FDI dependence on institutional quality — alternative productivity estimates.


















































































# Observations 7056 7056 7056 7056 7056 7056 7044 7025


















































































# Observations 7056 7056 7056 7056 7056 7056 7044 7025


















































































# Observations 7056 7056 7056 7056 7056 7056 7044 7025
R2 0.828 0.834 0.838 0.834 0.839 0.835 0.832 0.833
origin-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
destination-sector FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
extra country-pair controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: PPML estimation of equation (19). Productivity estimates based on the RM, LP, and ACF methods, respectively, and operating revenues.
Robust standard errors clustered by country pairs are reported in parentheses. The entries ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%
and 10%, respectively.
predictions about the interaction of firm characteristics and destination
institutional qualities. In particular, a more productive firm will choose
to engage in FDI in countries with poorer institutional qualities, all else
being equal.
We conduct extensive tests of the theory using worldwide firm-
level FDI activities during the period 2009–2016. An interaction term
of institutional qualities of home and destination countries is embed-
ded in a comprehensive gravity estimation equation controlling for
firm-level characteristics (and their interactions with destination insti-
tutional qualities), origin-year, destination-year, and destination-sector
fixed effects, proxies for bilateral barriers to FDI, the difference in
GDP per capita, and extra country-pair controls. The results indicate
a statistically significant complementarity effect of institutional quali-
ties. The findings are robust across eight alternative institutional qual-
ity indicators, stronger in sectors that rely more on institutions (to
enforce contracts), not driven by particular origin, destination, or sec-
tors, robust to dropping tax havens, and robust to the use of alter-
native productivity measures. We also verify that the findings are
consistent with the proposed theoretical mechanism by replacing the
20
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interaction of formal institutions with that of informal institutions at
home and formal institutions in the FDI destination. We find that firms
based in countries with more prevalent informal institutions tend to
engage in more FDI in destinations with poorer formal institutions. The
result is robust to alternative proxies of informal institutions and across
the various specifications discussed above.
Informal institutions are modeled in this paper in a rather sum-
mary manner. In reality, the concept likely embodies many facets of
firm-specific capacities growing out of a society’s political structure
and social conditions. The rich fabric and informal nature of these
human, social, and political investments by firms are difficult to quan-
tify. But they present an interesting avenue to understand the incen-
tives and constraints of firms based in developing countries, and their
comparative advantages when venturing abroad. To this end, future
research that constructs standardized proxies of these informal institu-
tions across countries and across time would be beneficial.
A. Theory Appendix
A.1. Proofs for the benchmark model of horizontal FDI
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Note that:
𝜕FFDI(rd, I∗h , Id)
𝜕Id
|||||Id=IE,∗d =


















where the second equality follows from the FOC for IE,∗d :






d ) = 0, and the sign follows from the assumption that f
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(ii) We can write:



































where the second equality follows from the definition of FE and FFDI , and
{
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d ) − F
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> 0 follows from the definition of FE,∗ and the
























where the sign follows from the assumption that fS(rd, Ih, Id) strictly increases in rd for S ∈ {E,P}, and from the FOC for I
FDI,∗
d such that
𝜕FFDI(rd, I∗h , I
FDI,∗
d )∕𝜕Id = 0.
















where the sign follows from the assumption that fE(rd, Ih, Id) strictly increases in rd and from the FOC for I
E,∗
d such that 𝜕F
E(rd, I∗h , I
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d )∕𝜕Id = 0. ▪









since the numerator is negative by the assumption in (2) and since 𝜕
2FD
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> 0 by the SOC for I∗h .
(ii) By total differentiation of (4) with respect to rd and I
E,∗
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by the assumption in (6) and by the SOC for IE,∗d .
(iii) By total differentiation of (5) with respect to rd and I
FDI,∗
















by the assumption in (6) and by the SOC for IFDI,∗d .
(iv) As a corollary,































by the assumption that fS(rd, Ih, Id) strictly decreases in Ih for S ∈ {E,P}, and by Proposition 2(i). ▪
Proof of Proposition 3. (ii) By total differentiation of (12) with respect to 𝜙 , we have:
𝜕2ΠΔ
𝜕𝜙𝜕rd
= (1 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝜎) 𝜋
FDI
𝜙wd
𝜔′(rd) > 0, (22)
because 𝜎 > 1 and 𝜔′(r) < 0.
(iii) It is straightforward to see that Bd has an analogous (positive) effect on
𝜕ΠΔ
𝜕rd
as 𝜙, because Bd and 𝜙 enter the profit function multiplicatively.
(iv) Finally, we have:
𝜕2ΠΔ
𝜕𝜂𝜕rd
= (1 − 𝜎)
[










< 1, which is necessary if FDI is the chosen entry mode instead of exporting (because the FDI variable profit must be larger
than exporting to compensate for the higher FDI fixed costs as shown in Proposition 1(ii)). In other words, for firms based in a country with a
sufficiently high wage (relative to the FDI destination, 𝜏hdwh > wd, after adjusting for trade cost), the wage saving of FDI relative to exporting (by
producing the intermediate component in destinations with higher rd and thus lower wd) becomes smaller when the headquarters intensity 𝜂 is
higher. ▪





3f S(rd, Ih, Id)
𝜕rd𝜕Ih𝜕Id
< 0, for S ∈ (E,P). (24)
In this case, all the propositions continue to hold in the direction predicted and with the effects reinforced. The proofs remain the same except with
the following modifications. First, in addition to Proposition 2(ii)–(iii), we establish the parallel derivative of IE,∗d and I
FDI,∗
d with respect to rh.
Proposition 2(ii’). By total differentiation of (4) with respect to rh and I
E,∗













by the assumption in (24), Proposition 2(i), and the SOC for IE,∗d .
Proposition 2(iii’). By total differentiation of (5) with respect to rh and I
FDI,∗




















by the assumption in (24), Proposition 2(i), and the SOC for IFDI,∗d .
Proposition 2(iv) is modified as a result:
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by the assumption that fS(rd, Ih, Id) strictly decreases in Ih and Id for S ∈ {E,P}, and by the result from Propositions 2(i), 2(ii’) and 2(iii’). Thus, the
fixed costs are further reduced by higher IE,∗d or I
FDI,∗
d as a result of larger rh.
Proposition 3(i). Given the assumption in (24), it follows that in (14):














since IFDI,∗d > I
E,∗
d by Proposition 1(i). As a result,
𝜕2ΠΔ
𝜕rh𝜕rd
> 0 in (13) continues to hold and with larger effects.
A.2. The case of vertical FDI
In this alternative setup, we develop the parallel propositions for the case of vertical FDI. The baseline structure remains the same, with the
following modifications. First, we abstract away from any kind of trade frictions (and thus the incentives of horizontal FDI driven by market access).
This implies there is a single world market for goods, with size indexed by B. A firm, given its productivity level, chooses whether to produce or
not. If it chooses to produce both headquarters and intermediate components at home (to serve the world market), it incurs a fixed overhead cost
fD(rh, Ih). If it chooses to produce the intermediate component in a country different from where it is headquartered, it incurs an additional overhead
cost fFDI(rd, Ih, Id), where the level of informal institutions that a firm builds at home affects (to some extent) its fixed operating cost in the host
country. Firms choose ID,∗h to minimize the fixed cost of local production: F





the fixed cost of multinational production: FFDI(rh, rd, Ih, Id) ≡ fD(rh, Ih) + fFDI(rd, Ih, Id) + kh(Ih) + kd(Id).

























d ) = 0. (26)
Define FD,∗(rh) and FFDI,∗(rh, rd) as the respective minimal fixed costs of local production and FDI. We make the same assumptions about fD(rh, Ih) as














We also start the analysis by assuming the neutral scenario that
𝜕2f FDI (rd, Ih, Id)
𝜕Ih𝜕Id
= 0, (28)
so there are no reinforcing effects of rh on the choice of Id through Ih. We discuss the possible scenario of reinforcing effects at the end of this
section. Basically, the proposed mechanism is further strengthened.
Proposition A.2.1. (i) The investment in informal institutions at home will be higher for firms engaging in multinational production than for firms engaging
only in local production: IFDI,∗h (rh, rd) > I
D,∗
h (rh). (ii) The total fixed cost of production will be higher for multinational production than for local production:
FFDI,∗(rh, rd) > FD,∗(rh). (iii) The total fixed cost of multinational production will be higher in FDI destinations with poorer institutions: dFFDI,∗/drd>0. (iv)
For a given FDI destination, the total fixed cost of multinational production will be higher for MNEs based in countries with poorer institutions: dFFDI,∗/drh>0.





























h ) = 0, and the sign follows from the assumption that f
FDI(rd, Ih, Id)





(ii) We can write the difference in the fixed costs as:
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FFDI,∗ − FD,∗ = {FFDI,∗ − FD(rh, I
FDI,∗
h )} + {F
D(rh, I
FDI,∗
h ) − F
D,∗}
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where the second equality follows from the FOCs for IFDI,∗h and I
FDI,∗
d in (25) and (26), and the sign follows from the assumption that f
FDI(rd, Ih, Id) strictly
increases in rd.
























by the FOC for IFDI,∗h in (25) and by the assumption that f
D(rh, Ih) strictly increases in rh. ▪
First, note that firms will have a stronger incentive to invest in informal institutions when they engage in multinational production than when
they produce only locally, because in the former case, the informal institutions can be used to help lower the overhead cost of both the headquarters
operation at home and the production abroad. Second, multinational production sets a higher threshold than local production in terms of fixed
costs. This helps explain the typical sorting of MNEs and local firms in terms of productivity. Third, poor state institutions discourage inward FDI
by raising the total fixed cost of multinational production (dFFDI,∗∕drd > 0). This is in spite of the fact that firms endogenously undertake heavier
investment in informal institutions should they choose such locations. Finally, poor state institutions also impose an absolute disadvantage on firms
based in the South; they incur a higher total fixed cost of multinational production than firms based in the North given the same choice of FDI
destination (dFFDI,∗∕drh > 0). This helps explain in part the dominance of MNEs from the North.
Proposition A.2.2. (i) Multinational firms headquartered in countries with poorer institutions will invest more in informal institutions at home:
𝜕IFDI,∗h (rh,rd)
𝜕rh
> 0. As a corollary, multinational firms headquartered in countries with poorer institutions will be more effective at reducing their fixed overhead















Proof. (i) By total differentiation of (25) with respect to rh and I
FDI,∗











The inequality follows because the numerator is negative by the assumption in (2); and 𝜕
2FFDI
𝜕I2h





















(ii) By total differentiation of (25) with respect to rd and I
FDI,∗
h , we have:
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The inequality follows because the numerator is negative by the assumption in (27); and 𝜕
2FFDI
𝜕I2h
> 0 by the SOC for IFDI,∗h . Similarly, by total differenti-
ation of (26) with respect to rd and I
FDI,∗













The inequality follows because the numerator is negative by the assumption in (27); and 𝜕
2FFDI
𝜕I2d
> 0 by the SOC for IFDI,∗d . ▪






ΠD,∗ ≡ 𝜋D − FD,∗(rh) = B𝜙(wh)1−𝜎 − FD,∗(rh), (31)






− FFDI,∗(rh, rd). (32)
Among possible destinations of FDI, firms take into account the lower wages but higher fixed costs associated with poorer institutions, and choose

















d )∕𝜕rd by the envelope theorem.
Proposition A.2.3. (i) (Complementarity of Institutional Qualities in Firm-level Vertical FDI) All else being equal, a firm will choose to undertake
FDI in countries with poorer institutional qualities, the poorer the institutional quality at home is:
𝜕r∗d
𝜕rh
> 0. (ii) All else being equal, a firm will choose to
undertake FDI in countries with poorer institutional qualities, the more productive the firm is:
𝜕r∗d
𝜕𝜙
> 0. (iii) All else being equal, a firm will choose to undertake
FDI in countries with poorer institutional qualities, the larger the world demand for the sector is:
𝜕r∗d
𝜕B > 0. (iv) All else being equal, a firm will choose to


















The inequality holds because: 𝜕
2𝜋FDI
𝜕wh𝜕wd
> 0 by the Cobb-Douglas functional form of 𝜋FDI ; 𝜕
2f FDI
𝜕rd𝜕Ih
< 0 by the assumption in (27); and 𝜕
2ΠFDI,∗
𝜕r2d
< 0 by the SOC
for r∗d .













= (1 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝜎)𝜋FDI∕(𝜙wd) < 0 and 𝜔′(r)<0.
(iii) It is straightforward to see that B has an analogous (positive) effect as 𝜙 on r∗d , because B and 𝜙 enter 𝜋
FDI multiplicatively.













= (1 − 𝜎)
[
(1 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝜎) ln whwd − 1
]
𝜋FDI∕wd > 0, since wh> wd holds at the optimal choice of FDI destination (lower wages at the FDI desti-
nation are necessary to compensate for the higher fixed cost of FDI). ▪
Institutional complementarity at the firm level in vertical FDI arises for two reasons. First, firms based in countries with poorer institutional
qualities tend to be more heavily endowed with firm-specific informal institutions, which gives them a comparative advantage in conducting FDI
25
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in destinations having poorer institutional qualities (since the adverse effect of weak institutions at the destination on fixed cost is reduced by the
firm-specific institutional investment, and more so in destinations with poorer institutions). This is the key mechanism proposed by the paper. In
addition, given the supermodularity between the headquarters and the intermediate component implied by the Cobb-Douglas production function,
a lower wage at home (a lower-cost headquarters input) also increases the marginal benefit (increments in variable profits) of securing a lower-cost
intermediate component. This second mechanism reinforces the main mechanism and strengthens the institutional complementarity effect on FDI
location choice. The interpretations of (ii)–(iv) are similar to the benchmark model.
In the remaining part of this section, we discuss the implications if Ih and Id are complementary in lowering fixed costs of FDI at the destination.
In other words, suppose that:
𝜕2f FDI (rd, Ih, Id)
𝜕Ih𝜕Id
< 0. (36)
In this case, IFDI,∗d is not determined by (26) alone, but is jointly determined with I
FDI,∗
h by (25) and (26). By total differentiation of (25) and (26)
with respect to rh, I
FDI,∗
h , and I
FDI,∗
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This is basically a stability condition on the system that the complementarity effect between Ih and Id on fFDI be sufficiently weak to ensure that the









































In parallel to the analysis above, if we totally differentiate (25) and (26) with respect to rd, I
FDI,∗
h , and I
FDI,∗


















dIFDI,∗d = 0. (43)
























































where the signs hold under conditions (27), (36), and (40). Thus, Proposition A.2.2 continues to hold, with the effects reinforced in scenario (36).
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In summary, the overall mechanism is reinforced in scenario (36).
B. Data Appendix
B.1. Deflator used in the productivity estimation
Let Ec,t indicate the exchange rate of country c in year t (in terms of local currency/USD), and let deflatorc,t ≡ Pc,t∕Pc,2008 denote country c’s
local deflator relative to year 2008. The current values of revenues and other input expenditures (in USD) are converted to 2008 PPP dollars by
deflator_2008_pppc,t ≡ deflatorc,t∕(Ec,t∕Ec,2008).
The local GDP deflators are retrieved from the World Bank World Development Indicators.20 The exchange rates are based on Penn World Table
version 9.1.21 The deflator for Taiwan is separately sourced from its government website.22
B.2. Country-pair controls
The data on GDP per capita (in current US dollars) are also retrieved from the World Development Indicators. The GDP for Taiwan (in local
currency) is sourced from the same government website as the deflator. The population of Taiwan is similarly sourced from its Statistical Bureau
website.23 The GDP for Taiwan is converted from local currency to US dollars (using the exchange rate from Penn World Table version 9.1 as noted
above) and divided by its population to derive its GDP per capita (in current US dollars).
The bilateral trade cost proxies (and FDI barriers) Xhd,t−1 are compiled from several sources. The CEPII website provides the data on bilateral
distance, and whether two countries are contiguous (contig), share a common language (comlang), have ever had a colonial link (colony), have had
a common colonizer after 1945 (comcol), are currently in a colonial relationship (curcol) or were/are the same country (smctry). See Mayer and
Zignago (2011) for further details.24 The data on whether two countries are currently in a regional trade agreement (rta), and whether they use
a common currency (comcur) are available from de Sousa’s website (de Sousa, 2012).25 Furthermore, the data on bilateral investment treaties are
obtained from UNCTAD.26 We construct a dummy variable that equals one if a BIT is currently in force between a country pair and zero otherwise,
according to the date a BIT enters into force. We set the cutoff date to be July 1st of the current year in defining the year-varying dummy bit.
The capital-labor ratio is constructed as the ratio of capital stock at current PPP (in million 2011 USD) and employment (in millions), both of
which are obtained from Penn World Table version 9.1.
The index of industrial structure similarity between two countries is constructed as indsimhdt = 1 −
√∑J
j=1 (vaht,j − vadt,j)2∕J, where vaht,j is the
value added of sector j in year t, as a percentage of GDP of country h, and similarly defined for vadt,j. Data on industrial value added are obtained
from the World Development Indicators, and are available for four distinct sectors: agriculture (ISIC divisions 1–5); manufacturing industry (ISIC
divisions 15–37); non-manufacturing industry (ISIC divisions 10–14 and 38–45, including mining, construction, electricity, water, and gas); and
services (ISIC divisions 50–99).
The religion similarity index is constructed based on the religion dataset of Maoz and Henderson (2013). The index follows Maoz and Henderson
(2013) and measures the similarity of religious compositions between two countries as relsimhdt = 1 −
√∑R
r=1 (raht,r − radt,r )2∕R, where raht,r is
the proportion of population in country h in year t adhering to religion r and similarly defined for radt,r . We use the top four religion categories:
Christianity, Judaism, Islam and Buddhism in calculating the index. The data are available for the period 1945–2010 in five-year intervals. We use
the 2005 data for years 2005–2009, and the 2010 data for years 2010–2015.
C. Online Appendix
The Online Appendix to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2020.102566.
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